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UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A
CELEBRITY'S NAME IN A
MOVIE TITLE: SECTION 43(A) OF




One of the benefits of being a popular celebrity2 is that manufac-
turers of goods often pay substantial fees to have a celebrity endorse
commercial products and services. 3 There can be no doubt that the use
of a celebrity's name, picture, or voice in an advertisement attracts a
consumer's attention to the product.4 Because a celebrity can sell the
right to use her name in these advertisements, the celebrity has an
economic interest in her personality.5 The law recognizes this interest
and courts often enjoin the unauthorized use of a celebrity's name in
advertisements for commercial products and services. 6 This Comment
will focus on the issue presented in Rogers v. Grimaldi,' namely,
whether courts also can enjoin the unauthorized use of a celebrity's
1. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
2. A celebrity has been defined as one who has "attained national or
international recognition in a particular field of art, science, business or other
extraordinary ability." Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72,79,
232 A.2d 458, 462 (Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
3. See Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, cnd Personal
Histories, 51 TEx. L. REv. 637, 642-48 (1973); Note, The Right of Publicity,
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and Copyright Preemption: Preventing the
Unauthorized Commercial Exploitation of Uncopyrighted Works of Art, 2
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 265, 266-67 (1983).
4. See Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the
Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1242-43 (1986); see also
Treece, supra note 3, at 644; Note, supra note 3, at 266-67.
5. Treece, supra note 3, at 643.
6. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831
(1983), affd on rehearing, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987) (manufacturer enjoined
from naming his portable toilets "Here's Johnny").
7. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
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name when it has been used in the title of a movie, book, or other
"worki] of artistic expression."s
II. ROGERS V. GPIMALD 9
A. The Facts
Plaintiff, Ginger Rogers, and the late Fred Astaire are one of the
most famous dance duos in show business history.'0 Because of their
fame, "Rogers and Astaire are among that small elite of the entertain-
ment world whose identities are readily called to mind by just their first
names, particularly the pairing 'Ginger and Fred.""' Needless to say,
Rogers has reached celebrity status, 2 because the use of Rogers' name
in the entertainment world attracts huge audiences.1" Rogers, like
many other celebrities, has permitted a manufacturer once to use her
name in advertising a commercial product.' 4 Well aware of the
commercial value of her name, however, Rogers has been highly
selective of the types of commercial enterprises she allows to be
associated with her name.'
5
In March of. 1986 the defendants Alberto Grimaldi, MGM/UA
Entertainment Co., and PEA Produzioni Europee Associate, S.R.L.,
produced and distributed in the United States a movie entitled "Ginger
and Fred."6 The movie is about the televised reunion of two fictional
Italian cabaret dancers named Pippo and Amelia. 7 In their earlier
years, Pippo and Amelia made a living by imitating Ginger Rogers and
8. Id at 997. The Rogers majority stated that "[m]ovies, plays, books, and
songs are all indisputably works of artistic expression." Id
9. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
10. Id. at 996. Rogers and Fred Astaire co-starred in ten musical films
beginning with "Flying Down to Rio" in 1933 and concluding with "The Barkleys
of Broadway" in 1949. Rogers and Astaire have been referred to as "the icons
of elegant ballroom dancing during Hollywood's Golden Age." Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
11. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
12. See supra note 2 for definition of "celebrity." Rogers has been an
entertainer for over 50 years; she has played major roles in 73 films and won an
Academy Award for her performance in "Kitty Foyle" in 1940. Rogers, 695 F.
Supp. at 113.
13. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
14. Id. "In the mid-1970s, [Rogers] licensed J.C. Penney, Inc. to produce a
line of GINGER ROGERS lingerie." Id
15, Rogers, 695 F. Supp. at 114.
16. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996. The famed Italian film-maker Federico Fellini
created and directed the film. Id.
17. Id. at 996-97.
[Vol. 55
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Fred Astaire and became known in Italy as "Ginger and Fred.' 18 The
subject of this controversy is the defendant's use of the title "Ginger and
Fred" for their fictional movie,19 a movie which plaintiff Ginger Rogers
did not sponsor, endorse, or participate in the making of in any way.
20
Because Rogers did not permit her name to be used in the title of
the movie, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York seeking injunctive relief and monetary
damages.21 Rogers claimed that the defendants "(1) violated section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), by creating the
false impression that the film was about her or that she sponsored,
endorsed, or was otherwise involved in the film, [and] (2) violated her
common law right of publicity."22 The defendants moved for summary
judgment dismissing Rogers' complaint.23 In granting the defendant's
18. Id Fellini, the film's director, made the following statement in an
affidavit submitted in support of the defendants motion for summary judgment:
The characters of Amelia and Pippo in [the Film] do not in any way
resemble Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers, nor were they ever
intended to portray them. Rather, Amelia and Pippo are two aging
and retired dancers who were Italian cabaret performers, whose "act"
consisted of an imitation of the American legends whose name they
borrowed for their routines.
Rogers, 695 F. Supp. at 115.
19. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
20. Id- at 996-97.
21. Rogers, 695 F. Supp. at 112. Rogers filed her complaint shortly after
distribution of the movie began in the United States. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
22. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997. Rogers' complaint also alleged that the
defendants "defamed her and violated her right to privacy by depicting her in
a false light." Id This claim, however, was not very strong and was disposed
of quickly by the majority. Id at 1005.
23. Id. at 997. The defendants submitted affidavits in support of their
motion for summary judgment. Rogers, 695 F. Supp. at 114. A portion of
Fellini's affidavit appears supra note 18. Rogers submitted a market research
survey in support of her in opposition to defendant's motion for summary
judgment; the "survey purport[ed] to establish that the title 'Ginger and Fred'
misled potential movie viewers as to Rogers' connection with the film." Rogers,
875 F.2d at 997. The majority stated in a footnote:
The survey sampled 201 people who said they were likely to go
to a movie in the next six months. Half of those surveyed were shown
a card with the title "Ginger and Fred" on it; the other half were
shown an actual advertisement for the movie. Of these 201, 38%
responded "yes" to the question: "Do you think that the actress,
Ginger Rogers, had anything to do with this film, or not?" Of these
respondents, a third answered yes to the question: "Do you think
Ginger Rogers was involved in any way in making this film or not?"
In other words, about 14% of the total 201 surveyed found that the
1990] 269
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motion, the district court held that "[b]ecause the speech at issue here
is not primarily intended to serve a commercial purpose, the prohibi-
tions of the Lanham Act do not apply, and the Film is entitled to the
full scope of protection under the first amendment."' Similarly, the
district judge held that first amendment concerns barred Rogers' right
of publicity claim.'
B. The Holding
On appeal, Rogers asserted the same claims as she did in the
district court.2 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district cour's grant of summary judgment2' and
held: (1) when the title of a movie which contains a celebrity's name
"surpass[es] the appropriately low threshold of minimal artistic
relevance"28 to the underlying movie and is not "explicitly misleading
as to [the] source or content"' of the movie, there is no violation of
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act;30 and (2) when the same title is not
"wholly unrelated"31 to the movie and is not "simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services,"32 the
celebrity's right of publicity is not violated.'
title suggested that Rogers was involved in making the film.
I& at 1001 n.8.
The majority also stated that "[t]he survey evidence, even if its validity is
assumed, indicates at most that some members of the public would draw the
incorrect inference that Rogers had some involvement with the film." Id. at
1001 (footnote omitted).
24. Rogers, 695 F. Supp. at 120-21.
25. Id at 124.
26. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-97.
27. Id. at 1005.
28. Id. at 999.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1000.
31. Id at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal.
3d 860, 865, 603 P.2d 454, 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 n.6 (1972) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring)).
32. Id at 1004 (quoting Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768,
769, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
33. Id. at 1004-05.
[Vol. 55
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III. THE THEORIES OF RECOVERY
A celebrity who seeks to enjoin the unauthorized use of her name,
generally, has two separate legal theories available to her.34 First, the
celebrity can allege that the defendant's use of her name constitutes
false advertising and thus violates section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.'
Second, she can claim that the defendants have appropriated the
commercial value of her name and, thus, have violated the celebrity's
common law right of publicity.6 These two theories are discussed
separately below.
A. Section 43(a) of The Lanham Act
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 37 creates civil liability for sellers
34. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,
833 (1983), affd on rehearing, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987).
35. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act:
You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84, 85 (1973)
("Section 43(a) is generally viewed as a reaction to the restrictive common law
action of false advertising.").
36. Halpern, supra note 4, at 1201 ("[t]he right of publicity as currently
understood... [is] that a celebrity has a right to damages and other-relief for
the unauthorized commercial appropriation of the celebrity's persona").
37. The full text of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in
connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers
for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or
representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services
to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of
the falsity of such designation of origin or description or representa-
tion cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce
or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be
liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality
falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said
locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
However, section 43(a) was amended by the Trademark Law Revision Act
of 1988. The amendment of subsection (a), which will take effect after
November 16, 1989, states:
(a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
1990]
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of goods or services in interstate commerce who falsely designate origin
or falsely describe their goods or services.38 The primary function of
section 43(a) is to "protect consumers from confusion as to the source of
goods in the market;"'3 therefore, the focus is on the public's interest
in not being deceived about the origin of goods.40 Thus, section 43(a)
focuses on the appropriator's act rather than on the celebrity's interest
in the commercial value of her name.
41
There are five elements of a cause of action42 for injunctive relief
under section 43(a).4 3 First, defendant's advertisement must be false
or create a false impression about the source of the goods.44 Second,
or misleading representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepre-
sents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1989).
The section 43(a) amendment will probably not affect the Rogers holding
because Rogers' section 43(a) claim failed primarily due to first amendment
concerns. See infra notes 146-178 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 37.
39. Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1193
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Halpern, supra note 4, at 1240-42.
40. Halpern, supra note 4, at 1241.
41. Id., supra note 4, at 1240-41. The right of publicity focuses on the
celebrity's interest in the commercial value of her name. See infra notes 94-97
and accompanying text.
42. A plaintiff is not required to show that its mark is registered or even
registrable in order to receive protection under section 43(a). Metric &
Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir.
1980); see also, Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1294
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Regarding the claim under the Lanham Act, it is not a
prerequisite that the mark be registered."); Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of
Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 162.
43. Elements one through three and five are found in Germain, supra note
35, at 96; element four is found in section 43(a) itself, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
44. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir.
1982); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see
also Germain, supra note 35, at 96-97.
272 [Vol. 55
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the defendant's actions must deceive or have a tendency to deceive the
public about the source of goods. 45 Third, the deception created by the
defendant must be material to the extent that it will likely effect the
consumer's purchasing decision.46 Fourth, the defendants must have
introduced the product into interstate commerce.4 7  Finally, the
defendant's actions must have caused the plaintiff actual injury or its
likelihood.
48
The standard of proof required in a section 43(a) action for
injunctive relief is the showing of a likelihood of consumer confusion
about the source of the goods.49 In Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's
Big Boy,"° the court approved a balancing test of eight factors for
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists among consumers
of goods.51 The factors are:
1. strength of the plaintiffs mark;
2. relatedness of the goods;
3. similarity of the marks;
4. evidence of actual confusion;
5. marketing channels used;
6. likely degree of purchaser care;
7. defendant's intent in selecting the mark;
8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
5 2
The plaintiff must "establish that use of its mark by a competitor
constitutes ... a false designation of origin or false representation
and ... [that] the public is likely to be confused by that use."53
45. Frisch's Restaurants, 670 F.2d at 647; Geisel, 283 F. Supp. at 268; see
also Germain, supra note 35, at 99.
46. Germain, supra note 35, at 96, 99-100.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
48. Germain, supra note 35, at 96, 100.
49. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th
Cir. 1983), affd on rehearing, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987); Frisch's Restaurants,
Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 1982); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979);
Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
50. 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982).
51. Id- at 648.
52. Id. (quoting AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.
1979)).
53. Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d
710, 714 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
698 F.2d 831; 833 (6th Cir. 1983) (test for equitable relief under section 43(a) is
likelihood of confusion standard); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp.
261,267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (plaintiff entitled to injunctive relief upon a showing
1990]
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Furthermore, the confusion requirement is satisfied if the public
believes that the mark's owner sponsored, endorsed, or approved the use
of the mark on the product.-' The public does not have to believe that
the owner of the mark actually manufactured and marketed the item.
55
Allen v. National Video, Inc.- demonstrates that the unauthorized
use of a celebrity's name in an advertisement for a commercial product
or service can satisfy the elements of a section 43(a) action and the
likelihood of confusion standard discussed above." In Allen, the
defendant used a lookalike of plaintiff Woody Allen in one of its
advertisements.58 The court noted that "the unauthorized use of a
person's name or photograph in a manner that creates the false
impression that the party has endorsed a product or service in interstate
commerce violates the Lanham Act. "59 The court applied the elements
of a section 43(a) cause of action, 60 and also considered six factors (very
similar to the eight factors discussed above) in deciding whether there
was a likelihood of confusion.61 The court then held that "[a] review
of all these factors leads ... to the ... conclusion that defendant's use
of [the lookalike's] photograph in [its] advertisement creates a likelihood
of consumer confusion over plaintiffs endorsement or involvement. '"0 2
While Allen demonstrates that the unauthorized use of a celebrity's
name or picture in an advertisement for a commercial product or service
can be enjoined under section 43(a),3 the general issue presented in
Rogers is whether the unauthorized use of a celebrity's name in
connection with a movie can also be enjoined under section 43(a).'
Movies, books, and other forms of entertainment are usually considered
of the likelihood of customer confusion as to the source or originator of the
goods).
54. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979).
55. Id at 204.
56. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
57. I
58. Id. at 617-18.
59. Id at 626.
60. I& at 625.
61. Id at 627. The six factors the court considered were: "1) the strength
of plaintiffs marks and name; 2) the similarity of plaintiffs and defendant's
marks; 3) the proximity of plaintiffs and defendant's products; 4) evidence of
actual confusion as to source or sponsorship; 5) sophistication of the defendant's
audience; and 6) defendant's good or bad faith." Id
62. Id. at 628.
63. Id.
64. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
274 [Vol. 55
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"works of artistic expression,"65 or alternatively, forms of "artistic
speech."66 Creators of "artistic speech," unlike creators of commercial
advertisements, 67 usually receive a certain amount of first amendment
insulation from section 43(a) claims because "[i]n the area of artistic
speech,. . .enforcement of trademark rights carries a risk of inhibiting
free expression."' To avoid inhibiting free expression, courts might
not enforce trademark rights when an artistic work infringes the
trademark as it did in Silverman v. CBS Inc..69 In Silverman the
plaintiff (the infringer in this case) sought to have the trademarks of the
"Amos 'n' Andy" radio programs declared in the public domain so that
he could use them in his Broadway musical. 0 In holding that the
trademarks were abandoned,7 1 the court stated that the fact that the
trademarks were being infringed by an artistic work "add[ed] some
weight" to the plaintiffs claims.7 2 Therefore, when a celebrity's name
is used in connection with an artistic work, rather than an advertise-
ment for a commercial product, the celebrity has a reduced chance of
recovery under section 43(a) because of the defendant's first amendment
right to freedom of expression.73
Nevertheless, "[t]rademark protection is not lost simply because the
allegedly infringing use is in connection with a work of artistic
expression."7 4 Indeed, the government can suppress communication,
whether in the form of commercial or artistic speech, if it is more likely
to deceive the public than inform it. 75 In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,, 6 the defendant's first amendment
65. See Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1989) (Broadway
musical considered work of artistic expression).
66. Id.
67. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980) ("The Constitution... accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression."); see also Vidal
Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d '272, 276 n.8 (2d Cir. 1981)
("Misleading commercial speech is beyond the protective reach of the First
Amendment ....").
68. Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1989).
69. 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989).
70. Id at 43.
71. Id. at49.
72. Id. at 48.
73. See id
74. Id- at 49.
75. Central Hudson Gas &Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979).
76. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
1990]
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defense to trademark infringement failed 7 7 when defendant's "gross
and revolting sex filmn"7 depicted the film's star "engag[ing] in various
sex acts'7 9 while wearing a uniform similar to the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders' uniform.80 In upholding the plaintiffs trademark rights
in the uniform,8 ' the court stated that while "defendants' movie may
convey a barely discernible message[, this] does not entitle them to
appropriate plaintiffs trademark in the process of conveying that
message."8 2  The court reasoned that defendant's first amendment
rights were not violated because there were "numerous ways in which
defendants [could] comment on 'sexuality in athletics' without infringing
plaintiffs trademark.""3 This reasoning is based on the so called
"alternative avenues of communication "84 standard. The court stated
that the plaintiff "need not 'yield to the exercise of First Amendment
rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of
communication exist[ed]"' for defendant.8 5 Thus, Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, a case in which the plaintiffs trademark rights prevailed
over defendants' interest in free expression, illustrates that it is possible
for a plaintiff to prevail in a section 43(a) action even when the
infringing use is in connection with a movie or artistic work.88
In both Silverman and Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders the plaintiffs
alleged the content of the artistic works were the infringement,8 7
whereas the issue in Rogers is whether a title alone which contains a
celebrity's name violates section 43(a).8 The only case which can be
found in which a plaintiff sought relief under section 43(a) for the
unauthorized use of a celebrity's name in a movie title is Hicks v.
Casablanca Records.8 9 The Hicks plaintiffs, heirs of the late Agatha
77. Id. at 206.
78. Id. at 202.
79. Id. at 203.
80. Id.
81. Id- at 204.
82. Id- at 206 (footnote omitted).
83. Id.
84. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972). The alternative
avenues of communication standard was developed by the Lloyd court. Id.
85. Dallas Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206 (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567).
86. Admittedly, Dallas Cheerleaders is an extreme example of a case in
which plaintiffs trademark rights outweigh the defendant's interest in free
expression, i.e., defendant's movie "Debbie Does Dallas," id. at 202, probably
would not be considered by most people to be an artistic work.
87. See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
88. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-97.
89. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Plaintiffs also sought relief under the
right of publicity. Id. at 429; see also infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 55
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Christie, sought to enjoin the defendant movie producers from distribut-
ing a movie entitled "Agatha."9° The plaintiffs alleged that "defen-
dants' use of the name 'Agatha'... would cause confusion in the minds
of the public in general, and Agatha Christie readers in particular, to
the effect-that the movie... [was] authorized or even written by Mrs.
Christie."9 1 The court dismissed plaintiffs' claim reasoning only "that
plaintiffs 'can prove no set of facts in support of [this] claim which
would entitle [them] to relief."'9 2 While Hicks indicates that a celebrity
plaintiff may not be able to recover under section 43(a) for the un-
authorized use of her name in a movie title,93 the court's lack of
sufficient reasoning might preclude its opinion from being persuasive to
future courts faced with the same issue.
B. The Common Law Right of Publicity
Unlike section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which protects the public
from deception about the origin of goods,94 the right of publicity95
90. Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 428. The movie presents a fictionalized account
of the mysterious eleven day disappearance of Agatha Cristie in 1926. Id. at
429. In a related case, plaintiffs also sought to enjoin a defendant publisher
from distributing a book entitled "Agatha." Id. at 428.
91. Id. at 433.
92. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
93. See id.
94. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
95. The right of publicity was first recognized in Haelan Laboratories v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816
(1953). Halpern, supra note 4, at 1201-02. It was developed as a result of the
inadequate protection the right of privacy afforded celebrities against the
unauthorized exploitation of their names and likenesses. Nimmer, The Right
of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1954). See generally Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Generally, the right of privacy protects a plaintiffs
right "to be let alone," Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 193, whereas the right of
publicity protects the plaintiffs right to be compensated for the "unauthorized
commercial appropriation of the [plaintiffs] persona." Halpern, supra note 4, at
1201. The right of publicity has since been approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562
(1977).
Before the right of publicity became well recognized, some cases, which
were actually right of publicity cases, were decided under the right of privacy.
See, e.g., Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72,232 A.2d 458 (Ct.
Oh. Div. 1967). See also Comment, The Right of Publicity-Protection For Public
Figures And Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 527, 534-41 (1976).
There is some confusion ad to whether the right of publicity is any different
from the right of privacy. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
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protects a celebrity's right to control and profit from the commercial use
F.2d 821, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1974) ("California ... courts would... afford legal
protection to an individual's proprietary interest in his own identity. We need
not decide whether they would do so under the rubric of 'privacy,' 'property,' or
'publicity'; we only determine that they would recognize such an interest and
protect it."). Dean Prosser stated that:
The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the
common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except
that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff, in
the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, "to be let alone." Without any
attempt to exact definition, these four torts may be described as
follows:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs
name or likeness.
Prosser, supra, at 389.
Many courts and commentators have felt that Dean Prosser's fourth type
of invasion of privacy is actually the right of publicity. See Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (1983) ("This fourth type has
become known as the 'right of publicity.' Henceforth we will refer to Prosser's
last, or fourth, category as the 'right of publicity."') (citations omitted), affd on
rehearing, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90
Wis. 2d 379, 388-91, 280 N.W.2d 129, 133-34 (1979); Endejan, The Tort of
Misappropriation of Name or Likeness Under Wisconsin's New Privacy Law,
1978 WIS. L. REv. 1029, 1030 (1978) ("The interest to be protected [by Prosser's
fourth type] deals primarily with the individual's 'right of publicity' and not the
right to be let alone in the classical sense of privacy."); Halpern, supra note 4,
at 1205-07, 1206 n.32, 1209-10; Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability
Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 453,461-67 (1981); Comment, supra, at 531-
33. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,
571-74 (1977).
There also have been numerous cases and commentaries on whether the
right of publicity is descendible. See generally Martin Luther King, Jr., Center
for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th
Cir. 1983) (the right of publicity is inheritable and devisable); Factors Etc., Inc.
v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (commercial exploitation rights in
the Presley persona are not descendible), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982);
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 329 (1979) ("the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to the
artist and must be exercised.., by him during his lifetime"); Halpern, supra
note 4, at 1215-37; Sims, supra; Note, supra note 3, at 277 n.69.
[Vol. 55
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of her name and likeness.96 Thus, the right of publicity grants a
celebrity the exclusive right to prevent others from exploiting the
commercial value of her name and likeness without permission.'
7
The court in Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.98 stated the
elements of a successful right of publicity case:
An individual claiming a violation of his right of publicity must
show: (1) that his name or likeness has publicity value; (2) that he
himself has "exploited" his name or likeness by acting "in such a way
as to evidence his ... own recognition of the extrinsic commercial
value of his.., name or likeness, and manifested that recognition in
some overt manner... ;" and (3) that defendant has appropriated this
right of publicity, without consent, for advertising purposes or for the
purposes of trade 9
The courts have not determined yet the outer limits of what
constitutes exploitation of a celebrity's name and likeness.' °  In
96. Carson v. Here'9 Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th
Cir. 1983) ("The right of publicity ... is that a celebrity has a protected
pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his identity."), affd on
rehearing, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987); Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) ("many prominent persons... would
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertise-
ments"); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (right of publicity "grants a person an exclusive right to control
the commercial value of his name and likeness"); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Pub.,
Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The right of publicity comprises a
person's right to own, protect and commercially exploit his own name, likeness
and persona."), affd, 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("common law right of publicity... recognizes
the commercial value of the picture or representation of a prominent person or
performer, and protects his proprietary interest in the profitability of his public
reputation or 'persona'") (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379,
391, 280 N.W.2d 129, 134 (1979) ("the right of publicity [is] the right to control
the commercial exploitation of aspects of a person's identity").
97. Bi-Rite Enters., 555 F. Supp. at 1198.
98. 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
99. Id. at 232 (quoting Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1978)) (citations omitted).
100. See Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1590 (1979) ("The language of some
courts would suggest that virtually any recognizable attribute would be
protected."); Note, supra note 3, at 278-79 ("Thus far, recognition has been given
to a proprietary interest in a celebrity's name, likeness, nickname, voice,
professional act, character portrayal, slogan, and possessions associated with
1990] 279
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Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum,"' the court found that
a ball-player "has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e.,
the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture.
10 2
Thus a ball-player, or an "exclusive grantee of a player's 'right of
publicity,' has a valid claim against' 0 3 anyone using the player's
photograph without permission."°  Courts have enjoined the un-
authorized use of a professional golfer's name in connection with a golf
parlour game, 0 5 and the unauthorized use of several hundred major
league baseball players' names in connection with a baseball table
game."°  Another court held that a professional entertainer had a
cause of action against a defendant who used an imitation of the
entertainer's voice to advertise its product.10 7 A professional racing
car driver was granted an injunction against a defendant's unauthorized
use of a photograph of the plaintiffs unique racing car in a television
commercial advertising the defendant's cigarettes.'" Although the
plaintiff himself was not recognizable in the photograph, the "distinctive
decorations appearing on the car ... were not only peculiar to the
plaintiffs cars but they caused some persons to think the car in question
was plaintiffs and to infer that the person driving the car was the
plaintiff. '11° 9
A celebrity's popular nickname has also found protection under the
right of publicity. In Hirsch v S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,"' the
defendant marketed a shaving gel for women under the name "Crazy-
legs.""' Plaintiff Hirsch, a professional football player known
him.") (footnotes omitted).
101. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
102. Id. at 868.
103. Id. at 869.
104. I&
105. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72,232 A.2d 458 (Ct.
Oh. Div. 1967). Although the golfer's name appeared inside the game only and
was not advertised on the lid of the game, id. at 80, 232 A.2d at 462, the court
stated that "[t]here is little doubt that a person is entitled to relief when his
name has been used without his consent, either to advertise the defendant's
product or to enhance the sale of an article." Id. at 77, 232 A.2d at 461; see also
Treece, supra note 3, at 665-68.
106. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); see also
Halpern, supra note 4, at 1209-10.
107. Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (lst Cir. 1962).
108. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974).
109. Id. at 827.
110. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
111. Id. at 382, 280 N.W.2d at 130.
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nationally as "Crazylegs,""' 2 brought suit against the defendant for
appropriation of a person's name for commercial use.1" 3 In holding
that Hirsch had a valid cause of action,"' the court stated: "[t]he fact
that the name, 'Crazylegs,' . . . was a nickname rather than Hirsch's
actual name does not preclude a cause of action. All that is required is
that the name clearly identify the wronged person.""1
5
Protection under the right of publicity has been extended even to
a popular phrase which is associated nationally with a celebrity. In
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.," 6 defendants "engaged
in the business of renting and selling 'Here's Johnny portable toi-
lets. ," 7  Plaintiff Johnny Carson brought suit alleging that defen-
dant's use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" infringed Carson's right of
publicity.118 In rejecting the defense that Carson's "name or likeness"
was not actually used,"9 the court held that defendants violated
Carson's right of publicity.' 2°  The court reasoned that "[i]f the
celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion
of his right whether or not his 'name or likeness' is used.'
121
Each of the cases discussed thus far illustrates a violation of a
celebrity's right of publicity when the celebrity's name or likeness is
used as the name of a product or in a commercial advertisement for the
sale of a product." The issue in Rogers is whether the use of a
celebrity's name in the title of a movie violates the right of publi-
city." Several courts have passed on this issue; the celebrity's right
ofpublicity claim failed in each case.
124
112. Id. at 384, 280 N.W.2d at 131.
113. Id at 382, 280 N.W.2d at 130.
114. I& at 383, 280 N.W.2d at 130.
115. Id at 397, 280 N.W.2d at 137.
116. 698 F.2d 831 (1983), affd on rehearing, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987).
117. Id at 833.
118. Id
119. Id at 835.
120. Id. at 836.
121. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
122. Among the products were toilets, cigarettes, baseball cards and shaving
gel. See supra notes 101-21 and accompanying text.
123. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1989). Thus, the
issue is the same as was presented under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, supra
notes 63-73 and accompanying text, namely, the defendant may be insulated
from right of publicity claims because her use of the celebrity's name is in
connection with an artistic work rather than a commercial product.
124. See infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
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In the Hicks v. Casablanca Records'2 case, the plaintiffs, in
addition to the section 43(a) claim, alleged that the defendant movie
producer's distribution of the movie entitled "Agatha" violated Agatha
Christie's right of publicity.'2 Dismissing plaintiffs complaints,12
the court held that "the right of publicity does not attach here, where a
fictionalized account of an event in the life of a public figure is depicted
in a novel or a movie, and in such novel or movie it is evident to the
public that the events so depicted are fictitious." 28 The court
reasoned that "the first amendment protection usually accorded novels
and movies outweighs whatever publicity rights plaintiffs may pos-
sess."'
129
In Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc.,13 plaintiff, Executor of the
Estate of Marilyn Monroe,13 1 alleged that defendant's publication of
a book entitled "Marilyn" violated Monroe's right of publicity.'32 The
court in Frosch also dismissed plaintiffs complaint," and stated that
"it does not matter whether the book is properly described as a
biography, a fictional biography, or .any other kind of literary
work.... It is enough that the book is a literary work and not simply
a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or ser-
vices." 134 The court reasoned that "[t]he right of free expression is so
important that we should not extend any right of publicity.., to give
rise to a cause of action against the publication of a literary work about
a deceased person."'
5
In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, ' the plaintiff, a
nephew of the deceased actor Rudolph Valentino, 137 alleged that
defendant's television broadcast of a film entitled "Legend of Valentino:
A Romantic Fiction" violated Rudolph Valentino's right of publicity."
125. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
126. Id at 429.
127. 1i at 433.
128. Id
129. Id
130. 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980).
131. Id at 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
132. Id
133. Id at 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
134. Id.
135. Id
136. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
137. Id at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
138. Id. at 861-63, 603 P.2d at 455-56, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
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Although the majority dismissed the plaintiff's claim for other rea-
sons,"3 9 the concurring judge stated:
While few courts have addressed the question of the parameters
of the right of publicity in the context of expressive activities, their
response has been consistent. Whether the publication involved was
factual and biographical or fictional, the right of publicity has not
been held to outweigh the value of free expression.140
The concurring judge stated in a footnote that the right of publicity did
not apply to plaintiffs case because defendant's use of the title was not
"wholly unrelated" to Valentino, and "this [was] not a case in which a
celebrity's name [was] used to promote or endorse a collateral commer-
cial product.''
Hicks, Frosch, and Guglielmi all indicate that a celebrity's attempt
to have enjoined the unauthorized use of her name in a movie title via
the right of publicity will probably fail due to the defendant's right of
free expression under the first amendment.'4 2 The right of free
expression arises because movies are works of artistic expression.
43
139. The majority found that the right of publicity is "not descendible and
expires upon the death of the person so protected." Id. at 861, 603 P.2d at 455,
160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
140. Id at 871-72, 603 P.2d at 461-62, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60 (footnotes
omitted).
141. Id. at 865, 603 P.2d at 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355 n.6.
142. See supra notes 125-41 and accompanying text. But cf. Hogan v. A.S.
Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Co. 1957) (professional golfer
recovered from defendant who used golfer's name and picture on the jacket and
in the text of a book in a manner which gave the impression that the golfer
participated in writing the book).
143. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. The first amendment
right which is at issue here is the right of free expression and not the right to
publish matters which are newsworthy or of public interest; the right to publish
newsworthy matters concerning celebrities has received mixed results from the
courts and commentators. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcast-
ing Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) ("the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not
immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his
consent"); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[T]he
First Amendment does not absolve movie companies-or publishers-from the
obligation of paying their help. They are entitled to photograph newsworthy
events, but they are not entitled to convert unsuspecting citizens into unpaid
professional actors."); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 448,
299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (1968) ("The scope of the subject matter which may be
considered of 'public interest' or 'newsworthy' has been defined in most liberal
and far reaching terms. The privilege of enlightening the public is by no means
limited to dissemination of news in the sense of current events but extends far
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One might argue that the right of free expression should not apply to a
movie producer because the producer's sole purpose in putting a
celebrity's name in the title of a movie is a commercial one, namely, to
attract consumer attention to the movie in order to increase profits."'
This argument fails, however, for the Supreme Court has stated:
That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for
profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why
operation for profit should have any different effect in the case of
motion pictures... . [W]e conclude that expression by means of
motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press
guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."'
beyond to include all types of factual, educational and historical data, or even
entertainment and amusement, concerning interesting phases of human activity
in general."); Treece, supra note 3, at 660-64; Comment, supra note 95, at 549-
57; Note, Celebrities and the First Amendment: Broader Protection Against the
Unauthorized Publication of Photographs, 61 IND. L.J. 697, 702-08 (1986).
In Rosemont Enters., Inc., v. Irving, 49 A.D.2d 445, 375 N.Y.S.2d 864
(1975), the plaintiffs motion for an order restraining the defendant from
publishing a manuscript purporting to be an authentic autobiography of Howard
Hughes was denied. Id. at 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 866. The court reasoned that:
Howard Hughes is very much a public figure. As such he obviously
is not and cannot be immune from public discussion or public
writings.... The right of privacy under the law was never contem-
plated to exclude or limit, within reasonable bounds, the right to
speak and write concerning a public figure. Prior restraint of
publication or censorship in advance of publication is generally
forbidden and may be unconstitutional unless the existence of certain
conditions necessitate such action for the public safety, public welfare,
or the preservation of the social order. Those elements are not
presented here.
Id. at 449, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (citations omitted).
144. This argument draws an analogy between a movie title and a
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services. See supra note 122
and accompanying text.
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IV. THE ROGERS COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. The Majority's Section 43(a) Lanham'Act Analysis
The court in Rogers v. Grimaldi4 ' first discussed Rogers' section
43(a) Lanham Act claim.'47 The majority began its discussion by
rejecting the district court's ruling that "the Lanham Act cannot apply
to the title of a motion picture where the title is 'within the realm of
artistic expression,' and is not 'primarily intended to serve a commercial
purpose.""4 8 That ruling "would create a nearly absolute privilege for
movie titles," the majority stated.'49 The majority believed the district
court's ruling would in effect place movie titles outside the scope of the
Lanham Act as long as the movie is an artistic work.'" Reasoning
that consumers have rights with respect to deceptive titles, the majority
held that movie titles, like advertisements, are within the scope of the
Lanham Act.' 5 1
According to the majority, authors have an interest in freedom of
artistic expression which is shared by their audience;" 2 therefore, this
interest requires more first amendment protection for titles of movies
than for advertisements of commercial products or services."' The
majority found that the "no alternative avenues of communication"'l 4
standard developed in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner" "does not sufficiently
accommodate the public's interest in free expression."'56 Thus,
because movie makers have an interest in free expression 157 but that
interest clearly warrants some government regulation by section
43(a),"s the majority held that the Lanham Act should "apply to
artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression."'59
146. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
147. Id at 997-1002.





152. Id- at 998.
153. Id
154. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566.67 (1972).
155. 407 U.S. 551 (1972); see also supranotes 84-85 and accompanying text.
156. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
157. See id at 998.
158. See id. at 997.
159. Id at 999.
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In applying this broad holding to allegedly misleading titles that
utilize a celebrity's name, the majority developed three rules."' First,
titles that have no artistic relevance to the underlying work violate the
Lanham Act because they are not justified by a free expression
interest.161  Second, titles that have some artistic relevance to the
underlying work but are "explicitly mislead[ing] as to the source or the
content of the work"'1 2 violate the Lanham Act because the interest
in avoiding consumer deception outweighs the interest in free expres-
sion." Lastly, titles that have "surpassed the appropriately low
threshold of minimal artistic relevance"'u1 and are "ambiguous or only
implicitly misleading',165 do not violate the Lanham Act because the
free expression interest outweighs the interest in consumer decep-
tion.1'
The majority then applied these rules to Rogers' claims 6 7 that the
defendant's film title gave the false impression that "(1) [she] produced,
endorsed, sponsored, or approved the film, and (2) the film is about
Rogers and Astaire."'16  In beginning its analysis, the majority first
accepted the district court's conclusion that the title "Ginger and Fred"
is sufficiently artistically relevant to the film itself.6 9 The majority
reasoned that the main characters in the film are nicknamed "Ginger"
and "Fred" which demonstrates "genuine relevance to the film's
story.'
70
Rogers submitted survey evidence to substantiate her claim that




163. Id. The majority stated that the titles "Nimmer on Copyright" and
"Jane Fonda's Workout Book" were examples of titles which might reach the
"threshold of minimal artistic relevance" but could be "explicitly misleading" if
they were false as applied to the underlying work. Id
164. I&
165. I& at 1000.
166. Id. The majority stated that the title of the hit song "Bette Davis Eyes"
and the title of the film "Come Back to the Five and Dime, Jimmy Dean, Jimmy
Dean" were examples of titles which reached the "threshold of minimal artistic
relevance," id. at 999, and were "ambiguous or only implicitly misleading." Id
at 1000.
167. Id. at 1000-02.
168. Id. at 1001.
169. Id. In other words, the title "Ginger and Fred" surpasses the
"threshold of minimal artistic relevance." See also supra note 164 and
accompanying text.
170. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001.
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reviewing the evidence,' the majority concluded that some members
of the public would get the false impression that Rogers endorsed the
film. 7 2 Nevertheless, the majority believed that the "risk of misun-
derstanding, not engendered by any overt claim in the title, is so out-
weighed by the interests in artistic expression as to preclude application
of the Lanham Act.' 17' The court then held that defendants were
entitled to summary judgment on Roger's sponsorship and endorse-
ment.
7 4
Disposing of Rogers' claim that the title gives the false impression
that the film is about her and Astaire, the majority stated that,
although the title may lead some to believe the film is about Rogers,
7 5
the title is "entirely truthful as to its content in referring to the film's
fictional protagonists who are known to their Italian audience as 'Ginger
and Fred." 7 6 Again the court believed the risk that the title would
mislead some consumers into thinking the film is about Rogers is
"outweighed by the danger that suppressing an artistically relevant
though ambiguous title will unduly restrict expression.,1 7  The
defendants were granted summary judgment on this aspect of Rogers'
section 43(a) claim as well. 7
8
B. The Majority's Right of Publicity Analysis
The court next discussed Rogers' right of publicity claim.1 79  It
first stated that:
171. Id.; see supra note 23.






178. Id at 1001-02.
179. Id. at 1002-05. Because the right of publicity is a state law claim, the
majority determined which state's law applied, a determination the district court
did not make. Id at 1002. Finding that Oregon law controls because that is
Rogers' domicile and that Oregon has little law concerning the right of publicity,
the majority stated that "[w]e are therefore obliged to engage in the uncertain
task of predicting what the New York courts would predict the Oregon courts
would rule as to the contours of a right of publicity under Oregon law." Id. The
conclusion reached was that "New York courts would . . . presume that the
unsettled common law of another state would resemble New York's but that they
would examine the law of the other jurisdiction.., in making an ultimate
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Because the right of publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no
likelihood of confusion requirement, it is potentially more expansive
than the Lanham Act. Perhaps for that reason, courts delineating the
right of publicity, more frequently than in applying the Lanham Act,
have recognized the need to limit the right to accommodate First
Amendment concerns.' 8
To satisfy these first amendment concerns, the majority relied on
two previous cases"' where the concern for free expression precluded
application of the right of publicity to bar the use of a celebrity's name
in the title of an artistic work.1 8 2 In the first case,'83 a concurring
Justice stated that the celebrity's right of publicity was not violated as
long as the title was not "wholly unrelated" to the movie. 4 The
second case 8 5 held that the celebrity's right of publicity was not
violated as long as the title was not "simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services."''1 The court granted
defendant's summary judgment motion on Roger's right and publicity
claim because "the title 'Ginger and Fred' is clearly related to the
content of the movie and is not a disguised advertisement for the sale
of goods or services or a collateral commercial product."'
8 7
. C. The Concurring Opinion
District Judge Griesa, sitting by designation, 18 submitted a
concurring opinion in the Rogers case." 9 Regarding the section 43(a)
Lanham Act claim, Judge Griesa disagreed with the majority's opinion
180. Id at 1004 (citations omitted).
181. These two cases were discussed supra notes 131-42 and accompanying
text.
182. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
183. The majority discussed the concurring opinion in Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Rrods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (Bird,
CJ., concurring). See also supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
184. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi, 25 Cal.3d at 865,603 P.2d
at 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355 n.6).
185. The second case the majority discussed was Frosch v. Grosset &
Dunlop, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). See also
supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
186. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Frosch, 75 A.D.2d at 769, 427
N.Y.S.2d at 829).
187. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05.
188. Id. at 996.
189. Id at 1005-07. Judge Griesa clarified that the only issues that Rogers
raised on appeal were the film's title and the advertising, not the film itself as
stated in the original complaint filed in the district court. Id at 1005.
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that the district court's ruling would place artistically relevant movie
titles outside the scope of the Lanham Act. 9° Judge Griesa reasoned
that the district court's "discussion of First Amendment protection for
artistic expression was his basis for deciding this case,"'9' and that the
district court "did not purport to write the law covering all possible
situations[]" as the majority in this case tried to do. 92
While Judge Griesa agreed with the majority that the title "Ginger
and Fred" does not violate the Lanham Act,193 he felt that this case
was not an appropriate case to "attempt to establish a rule based on the
asserted difference between explicitly misleading titles and those which
are ambiguous or only implicitly misleading," as the majority had
done. 94  Judge Griesa believed the' issue of whether there are
exceptions to the first amendment protection that artistically relevant
titles receive should be left to future courts' 95 because "when and if an
actual case arises, it may not fit within either of the categories posited
by the majority.' 196
V. THE IMPACT OF THE ROGERS DECISION
A. The Slowdown in the Expansion of Section 43(a)
In the last few decades courts have substantially expanded the
applicability and scope of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.197 Some
commentators have felt that section 43(a) has been extended too far and
applied in too many new areas. 98 In general, Rogers seems to




'194. Id. Judge Griesa discussed the example titles used by the majority to
illustrate titles that are "artistically relevant but explicitly misleading," supra
note 163, and those titles which are "artistically relevant and only implicitly
misleading," supra note 166. Judge Griesa concluded that "the illustrations
have nothing whatever to do with the kind of problem under discussion here."
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1007.
195. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1007.
196. Id As to Rogers' right of publicity claim, Judge Griesa believed that
there was sufficient Oregon law on the right of publicity to come to the
conclusion that this law was no different than that of New York or California.
Id Accordingly, Judge Griesa stated that the district court "sensibly avoided a
lengthy excursion into the subject of choice of law." Id Judge Griesa did not
disagree with any other aspects of the majority's decision on Rogers' right of
publicity claim. See id.
197. Germain, supra note 35, at 84-85.
198. Id at 85, 106-116.
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indicate that the applicability of section 43(a) has limits and that the
expansion of section 43(a) is possibly slowing dowr. 19  In cases
involving the unauthorized use of a celebrity's name in a movie title,
Rogers indicates that the applicability of section 43(a) has definite
limits.
20
Had the first amendment not been a concern, Rogers section 43(a)
claim probably would have been successful, for the title "Ginger and
Fred" seems to satisfy the elements of a successful section 43(a)
action.2° ' After Rogers, in order for a celebrity to recover for the
unauthorized use of her name in a movie title, she not only must prove
the usual elements of a successful section 43(a) action, but she must
also prove that the maintenance of the action will not violate the
defendant's first amendment rights. 2°2 This required showing that
first amendment rights are not violated will substantially reduce the
chances of success for the celebrity; thus the expansion of section 43(a)
into the factual situation presented by Rogers has been substantially
impeded by the first amendment.
Admittedly, other celebrities have not recovered under section 43(a)
when their names or likenesses were exploited without permission. For
example, Johnny Carson was unable to recover under section 43(a) in
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. .2 3 There, however, the
court affirmed the district court's finding that defendant's "use of the
phrase 'Here's Johnny' did not present a likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception."' '  Unlike Rogers, Carson simply did not
satisfy the basic elements of a successful section 43(a) case; 20 5
therefore, Carson was not a case in which the scope of section 43(a)
199. See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
200. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999; see also supra notes 146-78 and accom-
panying text.
201. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998-99; see also supra notes 171-78 and 42-48
and accompanying text. The title "Ginger and Fred" (1) gave some people the
false impression that Ginger Rogers either sponsored the film or was in it, see
supra note 23, (2) deceived the some of the public into thinking Rogers was
connected with the film, see supra note 23, (3) created material deception in that
some people probably saw the film because they thought Rogers was connected
with it, (4) the film did play in the United States and thus was introduced into
interstate commerce, and (5) the showing of the film caused a likelihood of
injury to Rogers.
202. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998-99; see also supra notes 157-66 and
accompanying text.
203. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), affd on rehearing, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir.
1987).
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needed restriction by the first amendment because a successful section
43(a) case was never established.'
Rogers is a case in which enforcement of section 43(a) will infringe
constitutional rights. Because these first amendment concerns
precluded application of section 43(a) in Rogers, the expansion of section
43 (a) is slowing down.
B. The Relationship Between the First Amendment
and the Right of Publicity
First amendment concerns for free expression caused Rogers' right
of publicity claim to fail.207  Although the first amendment often
defines the right of publicity's boundaries, 208 the right of publicity was
developed without incorporating a logical first amendment analysis into
that development.2° Thus, right of publicity actions in which the first
amendment is a concern will remain unpredictable until the courts
clarify the relationship between the first amendment and the right of
publicity.
2 10
The Rogers majority stated that the first amendment should be
applied more frequently to defeat right of publicity claims than to defeat
section 43(a) Lanham Act claims.2 ' Indeed, under the "wholly
unrelated" test 12 adopted by the majority a movie producer will
receive so much first amendment protection that she will not be liable
to a celebrity under the right of publicity unless the title has absolutely
206. See id.
207. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989); see also supra
notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 125-45 and accompanying text; see also Felcher &
Rubin, supra note 100, at 1590.
209. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 100, at 1579, 1590-1591.
210. Id
211. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004; see also supra notes 179-80 and accompany-
ing text.
212. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. Recall that the "wholly unrelated" test states
that the unauthorized use of a celebrity's name in a movie title will not violate
the celebrity's right of publicity unless the title is "wholly unrelated" to the
movie. Id (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 865,
603 P.2d 454, 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 n.6 (1972) (Bird, C.J., concurring));
see also supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. Part of the test adopted by
the majority also stated that the right of publicity would be violated if the title
was "simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services." Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlop, Inc.,
75 A.D.2d 768, 769,427 N.Y.S.2d 828,829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)); see also supra
notes 185-86 and accompanying text. However, this section of this note will
focus on the "wholly unrelated" test.
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nothing to do with the movie."' Presumably, a movie producer can
escape liability simply by creating just one scene in the movie which is
only sparsely related to the title. 14 The Rogers majority has given
movie producers a tremendous amount of first amendment protection by
adopting the "wholly unrelated" test.
In Zacchini u. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.," 5 however, the
United States Supreme Court seemed to suggest that a defendant
appropriator of a celebrity's name or likeness will receive less first
amendment insulation from right of publicity claims than claims under
other theories of recovery, such as the right of privacy.216 The court's
reasoning is based on the theory behind the right of publicity; namely,
a celebrity enforces her right of publicity not to withhold the material
in controversy, but rather to be compensated for it.217 Enforcing the
right to be compensated does not deprive the public of any information
and would not seem to violate the first amendment.218  Although
Zacchini involved the broadcast of an alleged newsworthy event,
219
rather than the broadcast of a work of artistic expression as in
Rogers,22° the Zacchini Court's reasoning would apply to both cases
because the purpose of suing under the right of publicity is the same,
namely, for the celebrity to receive compensation. Therefore, the Rogers
holding is not entirely consistent with the Zacchini holding in that the
Rogers majority gave defendants more first amendment protection than
the Zacchini court would have given.221
Rather than developing their own analytical framework for
incorporating first amendment concerns into the right of publicity
analysis, the Rogers majority adopted the "wholly unrelated" test from
213. Whether the words "absolutely nothing to do with" are equivalent to
"wholly unrelated" is arguable; however, the absence of a concrete definition of
"wholly unrelated" in the Rogers majority's opinion allows one to speculate on
its meaning.
214. If at least one scene is related to the title, then the title is not "wholly
unrelated" to the movie. See id.
215. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
216. Id- at 578.
217. Id; see also supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
218. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
219. Id at 563-65.
220. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
221. This conclusion is reasonable, based on the large amount of first
amendment protection the Rogers court has given the defendants under the
"wholly unrelated" test, supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text, and the
Zacchini court's suggestion that enforcing the right of publicity does not
necessarily infringe first amendment rights.
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a previously decided case.222 A concrete definition of "wholly unre-
lated," however, is not found in the majority's opinion.2 Instead the
majority discusses the examples used by Chief Justice Bird in the
concurring opinion in Guglielmi.2 4 Chief Justice Bird discussed two
examples: (1) the title "Legend of Valentino: A Romantic Fiction" does
not violate the right of publicity,225 and (2) the title "Rudolph Valen-
tino's Cookbook" on a book containing recipes and menus not related to
Valentino probably does violate the right of publicity. 2  Yet, these
two titles do not seem to illustrate the issue in Rogers because both
titles contain not only Valentino's name, but additional words which
seem to describe the underlying work, namely, "A Romantic Fiction" and
"Cookbook. '227 In Rogers, the title "Ginger and Fred" contained only
Rogers' and Astaire's names;22 therefore, the Rogers majority should
have discussed whether the right of publicity would bar a title such as
"Rudolf Valentino." This discussion is needed in order to clarify
whether the title "Ginger and Fred," which does not contain any other
words that describe the underlying work, is "wholly unrelated" to the
underlying artistic work. The majority's reliance on these examples is
the extent of their first amendment analysis of Rogers' right of publicity
claim.
Because the Rogers adoption of the "wholly unrelated" test possibly
conflicts with suggestions by the Supreme Court in Zacchin, 23 the
relationship between the first amendment and the right of publicity
remains unclear. By relying on previous cases 23' which did not
222. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. The majority adopted the test from the
concurring opinion of Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860,865,
603 P.2d 454, 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 n.6 (1972) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
See also supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
223. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
224. Id
225. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 862, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
226. Id. at 865, 603 P.2d at 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355 n.6.
227. The title "Legend of Valentino: A Romantic Fiction" indicates that the
underlying artistic work is a fictional performance related to Valentino, and the
title "Rudolf Valentino's Cookbook" indicates that the underlying artistic work
is a cookbook.
228. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-97.
229. The title "Ginger and Fred" does not give any indication of the nature
of the underlying artistic work; it could be a biography about Ginger Rogers and
Fred Astaire, a fictional movie about Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, or maybe
even a cookbook. Likewise, the title "Rudolf Valentino" does not indicate the
nature of the underlying work; therefore, this example title would seem more
appropriate for the Rogers majority to analyze.
230. See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
231. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
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adequately define the relationship between the first amendment and the
right of publicity,2 2 the majority did not seize the opportunity to
develop a much needed logical analysis.
C. Section 43(a) Versus
the Right of Publicity
Although the Rogers majority placed strong first amendment
restrictions on the applicability of section 43(a)2 and the right of
publicity' in cases involving the unauthorized use of a celebrity's
name in a movie title, recovery under these two theories is still
possible.' Because of the availability of two theories of recovery, an
analysis of which one will more likely be successful for the celebrity is
in order.
Assume for the moment that a defendant receives the same amount
of first amendment protection from both section 43(a) claims and right
of publicity claims. To recover under section 43(a), the celebrity must
prove a likelihood of confusion,2 an element not required under the
right of publicity.2 7 Therefore, it seems that recovery will be more
difficult under section 43(a).'
The Rogers majority stated, however, that the defendants should be
given stronger first amendment protection from right of publicity claims
than from section 43(a) Lanham Act claims.m The "wholly unrelated"
test adopted by the majority seems to give the defendants this stronger
first amendment protection from right of publicity claims. °  To
recover under the right of publicity the celebrity must show that the
232. See supra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
233. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998-99; see also supra notes 157-66 and accompany-
ing text.
234. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05; see also supra notes 179-87 and
accompanying text.
235. Clearly, a celebrity can still prevail on a section 43(a) action if the
celebrity can prove that the title has fallen below a "threshold of minimal
artistic relevance." Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999; see also supra notes 151, 164-66
and accompanying text. Likewise, a celebrity can recover under the right of
publicity if the celebrity prove the title is "wholly unrelated" to the movie.
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05; see also supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
238. The additional required showing of a likelihood of confusion would
seem to make recovery more difficult under section 43(a).
239. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004; see also supra note 180 and accompanying
text.
240. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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title is "wholly unrelated" to the movie;2 1 that the title has absolutely
nothing to do with the movie.242 To recover under section 4 3(a), the
celebrity must show that the title falls below a "threshold of minimal
artistic relevance;"'  that the title falls below a minimal level of
artistic relevance, not just a minimal level of relevance. 2" Common
sense dictates that it will be more difficult for the celebrity to prove that
a title is "wholly unrelated" to a movie than to prove that the title has
simply fallen below a "threshold of minimal artistic relevance" to the
movie. For it is possible that a title that has not reached a minimal
level of artistic relevance to a movie can still be related to the movie.
Thus, the right of publicity "wholly unrelated" test is more difficult for
the celebrity to prove than the section 43(a) "threshold of minimal
artistic relevance" test.
Recovery under section 43(a) is usually more difficult than under
the right of publicity because one must prove a likelihood of confu-
sion. 5 Under the rules adopted by the Rogers majority, however,
recovery for the unauthorized use of a celebrity's name in a movie title
will be more difficult under the right of publicity because of the stronger
first amendment protection afforded the defendants by the "wholly
unrelated" test.2 6
VI. CONCLUSION
A celebrity whose name is used in the title of a movie without the
celebrity's permission will find it very difficult to get an injunction.2 A7
While section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is applicable to this situa-
tion," s the celebrity must prove, in addition to the normal elements
of a section 43(a) action, 9 that the title falls below the "threshold of
minimal artistic relevance," or that the title is explicitly misleading as
to the source and content of the work.Y These additional require-
241. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004; see also supra notes 183-84 and accompany-
ing text.
242. See supra note 213.
243. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999; see also supra notes 164-66 and accompanying
text.
244. See id.
245. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 160-66, 183-87 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
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ments are required first amendment concerns and indicate that the
expansion of section 43(a) is slowing down.2'
To recover under the right of publicity, the celebrity must show that
the title is "wholly unrelated" to the movie, or that the title is actually
a "disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or ser-
vices.' , 2 The strong first amendment protection given to the defen-
dants by the "wholly unrelated" test may make recovery under the right
of publicity more difficult than under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.=
RICHARD E. WAWRZYNIAK
251. See supra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 233-46 and accompanying text.
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